Vladimir Nikolaevich Chelomei was born in 1914, studied at the Kiev Polytechnic until 1937, during his studies he published a solid textbook on vector analysis, and his work on the theory of dynamic stability became classic. In 1936, Chelomey underwent practical training at an aircraft plant in Zaporozhye. It was at this time that an emergency occurred at the plant. The shaft of one of the aircraft engines intended for fighter aircraft could not withstand the design loads and broke. The designers tried to prevent breakdowns by increasing the thickness of the shaft, but even then the engine regularly failed. You can guess what this threatened the plant with in those years. The chief engineer was already preparing for arrest when student trainee V. Chelomey offered him his own way to eliminate the accident: reduce the thickness of the shaft. A paradoxical solution: not to increase, but, on the contrary, to decrease! The drowning man clutches at straws: “Do it, but on personal responsibility!” And the engine started working! The student gave a course of brilliant lectures at the plant on the dynamics of aircraft engines, presenting the results of his own research. (The glory and power of paradoxical decisions - decisions that to others seemed absurd, illogical, decisions that do not advance, but push forward, so that the movement of V. Chelomey’s thought now seems explosive, pulsating - from now on did not leave him... until the last moment, take this literally.) 1939: defense of the candidate's thesis, 40th - invitation to the “Stalinist” doctoral program (50 doctoral students in total). 1942: First tests of a pulsating air-breathing engine, the result of major research from 1936-1940. (The author's certificate was received by Chelomey in 1938. In Germany, the Argus company entrusted P. Schmidt with the creation of a pulsating engine for an unmanned aerial vehicle at the beginning of the war, at the end of 1942 such an engine and device were created, this is the V-1, the creators of which have been for a long time time, they cannot eliminate the effects of vibration on the instrumentation of the projectile aircraft. Tests of the Chelomei engine, which lacked this defect, were carried out in Lefortovo and frightened Moscow with sounds similar to the firing of anti-aircraft batteries. The tests were attended by the commander of the Air Force, General A. A. Novikov, and the People's Commissar of the aviation industry. A.I. Shakhurin.) After it became known about the creation of a German projectile aircraft, the young designer Chelomey was appointed chief designer and director of the plant, which was previously headed by the famous “king of fighters” N.N. Polikarpov (in recent years his life was heavy: the planes were not moving, it is unknown why. Maybe they were in too much of a hurry...). The new chief designer is thirty years old. His character is not easy: the story is known of how he rolled out of his hangar a captured plane, the booty of Tupolev. Tupolev, enraged, called Stalin. Stalin inquired how old the impudent man was. That was the end of the matter. Miracle. In 1944, Chelomey began creating the first cruise missile based on a pulsating engine. The following is very short: doctoral defense - 1951, corresponding member - 58th, General Designer - 59th, academician - 1962. Launch of the world's first maneuvering satellite - 1963. The launch, called in the West “aerobatics in space.” Four Proton space laboratories, which were launched by a launch vehicle of the same name, which was fundamentally new in contrast to the royal design. (To this day, Proton launches lunars, Cosmos, Mars, Vega into space.....) If Korolev, who in an almost casual speech on the geophysical year of the Earth gave the definition of our space: peaceful, was officially involved exclusively space, very soon manned space and almost immediately public space (yes, Korolev was classified, but the world suspected sole rule in Soviet space), then Vladimir Chelomey’s company did not begin as a space company.
In March 1945, Chelomey was summoned to a meeting at the Defense Committee: the issue of using an aircraft projectile was being decided. The cruise missile was called 10X: the tenth modification of an unknown weapon. The Americans had nothing like this. The Germans had a V-1 missile. A year is ahead until the day when the Korolev will be urgently taken to the Peenemünde training ground captured by the Allied troops to select some equipment - the Americans will get the father of the V-2, Wernher von Braun. (There is an assumption that Brown, with a bandaged broken arm, was already in our hands, but did not arouse interest and limped to the Americans, after which the history of rocket science developed as it developed: many Germans worked for us, but Brown was not among them , who was, so to speak, by the nature of the results, Chelomey’s German double...) During 1945, the 10X was supplied to the Soviet Army. There is a film of the rocket taking off. The meeting with Stalin regarding the use of 10X included aspects that were dangerous at that time. Beria asked a tricky question: “So who has who?” What was meant, obviously, was a parallel movement in the design ideas of the creators of the 10X and V-1. Chelomey calmly replied: “What I could not borrow is obvious. Well, could the Germans be with me? That’s a question for you, Lavrenty Pavlovich.” Next, Stalin asked the question: is it possible to use 10X now? The designer gave a firmly negative answer, noting that the accuracy of the projectile would not make it possible to avoid civilian casualties. If the answer had been different (in other words: if ambition had taken over the designer for a moment, ambition and fear...), the horror of the bombing of Dresden by American aircraft would have been surpassed by us. Thus fate revealed the character of the future General.
The projectile aircraft was tested in Kapustin Yar, on the Black and North Seas. And Novikov and Shakhurin, who supported the designer, were arrested on charges of supplying faulty aircraft to the front: Vasily Iosifovich Stalin in Potsdam, during a meeting with his father, praised American cars!.. It is known that the arrested Novikov was forced to testify against Marshal Zhukov.
Two professional leaders of the aviation industry waited for liberation until Stalin's death. In 1953, another test of 10KhN was underway in Kapustin Yar, when, ten days before his death, Stalin signed a decree of the Council of Ministers on the liquidation of a number of enterprises. There is no doubt that death prevented the scenario from unfolding. Chelomey’s “company” was also on the blacklist. This was the first, but not the only case when Vladimir Chelomey was excommunicated from his business, giving it to someone else. (For memory: the 53rd, 70th, 81st were dramatic, and all are a separate story.) All the work was given to Artem Mikoyan, who wanted to make a cruise missile, replacing the pilot in the MIG with an automatic system. Sergei Beria, who did not get along with one of the former employees of the cruise missile designer, was also involved in the massacre (statement of G. Boltyansky and V. Avduevsky). There is also a guess: by the time of Stalin’s decree, Beria’s son already had a certain company of his own, also related to missiles... was not the selection of the most important topics, from the same Chelomey, dictated by the paternal concern of Lavrentiy Pavlovich? After all, Mikoyan was only involved in manned aviation; the idea of a mechanical combination of a machine gun and an airplane does not stand up to criticism, but it could have belonged to an imperious non-professional... What happened to Chelomey’s company during these years leaves a feeling of uncertainty. The small design group that remained with Chelomey was located in Tushino and stubbornly continued its work - working to reduce the guides on which 10X launched (the guides were reduced from 30 to 7 meters). Chelomey did not reconcile himself and tried to get an appointment with Beria, which amazed him. Finally, he personally proposed to the head of the navy the idea of re-equipping the fleet and equipping it with cruise missiles (the modern history of the Navy begins from this day). In the summer of 1955, Keldysh called the disgraced designer: “A decision has been made to create a large enterprise to implement your proposals, a place has been allocated for construction.” This is how “Chelomey’s company” began on the outskirts of Moscow.
Three years later, the company, barely getting back on its feet, began designing and creating ballistic missiles: in December, a decision was made to create the Strategic Missile Forces. The company, on the initiative of the General Designer, organized lectures on the aerodynamics of hypersonic speeds, remember the lectures of a Kyiv student at an aircraft factory in 1936: he was tireless as a teacher, his favorite expression: “Think! Think!”
For the system to be stable, it must be shaken very often.
Social crises, high-profile scandals and revelations, “projects of the century”, daring shocking acts, political and economic demarches...
From time to time, something shakes and shakes us, our lives, and social foundations. Neither morality, nor way of life, nor goal ideals manage to remain in peace for a long time or, in other words, “rest on their laurels.”
An unexpected turn in someone’s thought, a complexly inspired large-scale incident, a uniquely unnatural story widely disseminated by the media - and everything that formed the foundation of our credo, our educational and “understanding” peace, in an instant begins to bend and break (like trees in a storm) something brought in, unexpected, powerful.
Sensations of human abomination and the greatness of nobility, a dashingly twisted plot of wise theorizing, an amazing narrative, the breaking and crushing of idols and ideals by truth-seekers, truth-makers and prophets...
Does this go unnoticed? Isn't that something that sticks with us? Doesn't the world that changes us change us?
Perhaps these are rhetorical questions. And the answers will be noticeably banal - “yes”, “of course”, “well, what doubts can there be?”
You have probably already noticed that we are not talking about natural disasters, which both nature and society are full of, but about what people consciously “create”, do and cause.
It seems that someone or something is methodically and steadily depriving us of complacency and peace.
The question is: why? and what is the role of such intervention in our private and general existence?
There is no shortage of explanations, if we take it globally and, so to speak, “ab ovo”. Here is the catchy-helpful “theory of catastrophes” with its “has been and will be” and that it is inappropriate to ask “small”, “insignificant”, “creature” questions worthy of a creator. And the theory of “oscillatory systems”, with the usual transcendental instructive slyness: “This is how this world is, and why it is like this, neither the smart nor the fool knows.”
Yes it is. Probably so. Maybe so.
Doubts are inappropriate, there are no alternatives, only a madman does not accept.
And yet, and yet...
In 1956, Vladimir Nikolaevich Chelomey (1914 - 1984) - academician, designer of military aircraft, General Designer of space technology - discovered a paradox: in order for the system to be more stable, it must be shaken very often.
Since childhood, we have become accustomed to the fact that heavy metal balls sink in water, while wooden objects, on the contrary, float. This is a manifestation of the well-known law of Archimedes. But it is disrupted if the vessel with liquid in which these objects are located begins to vibrate. At a certain amplitude of vibrations, everything becomes the other way around: metal balls float, and the tree sinks. Or another example. A straight vertical rod, which has one hinged support at the bottom, is fitted with a washer with a hole whose diameter is slightly larger than the diameter of the rod. Under the influence of gravity, the puck falls. However, if the hinge support of this rod is given vertical vibrations, the washer does not fall, but remains in an almost motionless position on the rod, as if in weightlessness, while the rod stands almost vertically. Or here is an example of how vibrations can be used to increase the stability of elastic systems. If a heavy weight is placed on a vertical rod, it will bend the rod. But if the load is made to vibrate, the rod will straighten again.
Curious, isn't it? There is something to think about and ponder. But not only! There is something to remember, as they say, “in connection” and “on occasion”:
Socrates, questioning his compatriots in search of knowledge and driving them to white heat with his sarcastic irony, showing that any knowledge turns out to be ignorance. And his favorite: “I know that I know nothing” became the eternal chilling refrain of the sons of men.
The Liar Paradox: one of the most famous logical paradoxes. In its simplest form, a person utters one phrase: “I’m lying.” Or he says: “The statement I am now making is false.” Or: “This statement is false.” If the statement is false, then the speaker told the truth and, therefore, what he said is not a lie. If the statement is not false, but the speaker claims that it is false, then his statement is false. It turns out, therefore, that if the speaker is lying, he is telling the truth, and vice versa.
The traditional laconic formulation of the paradox says: if a liar says that he is lying, then he is both lying and telling the truth.
The discovery of the “Liar” is attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides (IV century BC). It made a huge impression. The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (c. 281-208 BC) dedicated three books to him. A certain Philetus of Kos, despairing of resolving the paradox, committed suicide. Tradition says that the famous ancient Greek logician Diodorus Kronos (d. ca. 307 BC) already in his declining years made a vow not to eat until he found a solution to the “Liar”, and soon died without anything having achieved. In ancient times, "Liar" was considered a good example of an ambiguous expression.
It was necessary to come up with something like this! The mind gave the human mind a resounding, indecent slap in the face.
And here, as always, we, having lost, regained our sight: we lost faith in the power of the word, but comprehended the nature and mystery of language.
Antinomy of Euathlus. According to legend, the sophist philosopher Protagoras (5th century BC) entered into an agreement with his student Euathlus: Euathlus, who studied law, must pay for his studies only if he wins his first trial. Having completed his studies, Evatl did not, however, participate in the processes. Protagoras sued him, arguing his claim in this way: “Whatever the result of the trial, Euathlus will have to pay. He will either win this first case, or lose. If he wins, he will pay by virtue of the concluded agreement. If he plays, will pay according to the court decision." To this Evatl replied: “If I win, the court’s decision will free me from the obligation to pay. If the court is not in my favor, it will mean that I lost my first case and will not pay by virtue of the contract.”
Well what can I say?! Yes, nothing except what has already been said in the “golden law” of penetrating the secrets of the world - luck is where work begins, where every day is always new.
The October (1917) revolution in Russia, which severely tested the foundations of capitalism and strengthened them beyond words. Cuban Missile Crisis (1961), when higher education
The political leadership of the USSR planned and synthesized a situation in which the world shuddered, but firmly and finally took the path of self-preservation.
Based on the examples given, two fundamental conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in each of these cases the world turned, was turned over, transformed. And secondly, a generalization of the “Chelomey principle” in its final and already social version could sound like this:
For the system to be stable, it must be shaken vigorously from time to time.
Many books and articles have now been written about the activities of one of the greatest Soviet designers V.N. Chelomey and his OKB-52.
For the most part, they are all devoted directly to missiles and their engines, but in rare cases it is indicated that back in the early 1960s (!) the OKB-52 team proposed one of the world’s first detailed missile defense projects.
Moreover, this project was not based on some fantastic inventions, as the Americans liked to do, but on very real existing developments.
The rapid development of rocket technology in the late 1950s and early 1960s. one way or another would lead to the creation of a system for detecting and intercepting ballistic and intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads. Of course, it will not be possible to destroy a “swarm” of missiles with one counterstrike - this is impossible by definition. However, it was then quite possible to intercept most warheads, especially considering the fact that they had no multiple warhead at all.
Based on this theory, in August 1961, OKB-52 specialists under the leadership of V.N. Chelomey developed a missile defense project, the main purpose of which was to cover strategically important targets on the territory of the USSR. The scheme of action was as follows.
In the most missile-dangerous direction, where the main targets for American missiles were Moscow and Leningrad, the TsSO-P radar (wavelength range 30 cm) was supposed to operate, which carried out identification and target designation. The installation was located 500 km from Moscow in the direction of Leningrad and “covered” both “routes” of missiles. Additionally, the RO-1, Murmansk and RO-2 radars in Riga and others were used, covering the northern “flank” through which missiles launched directly from US territory could fly.
The interception itself was constructed in a very non-trivial way. Since an accurate guidance system did not exist then, in principle, it was intended to destroy enemy missiles using oncoming atomic explosions. According to the project, it looked like this - UR-100 missiles with a 10 Mt nuclear warhead were launched from silo installations. Having entered the course of enemy missiles and getting as close as possible to them, the nuclear charge was activated.
Despite a number of shortcomings, on March 3, 1963, a Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers was issued on the development of the Taran missile defense system. A.L. Mints was appointed chief designer of the missile defense system. Also, from that time on, the system began to bear the name “Taran”, which quite accurately reflected its content.
The project developed very quickly, but already in 1964 work on it had to be stopped. At a report to the government on the state of missile defense development by OKB-53, Academician M.V. Keldysh cited the following fact: to repel an attack by 100 ballistic missiles, it will be necessary to detonate 200 missile defense missiles with nuclear warheads over the country’s territory.
Despite the relatively low power of their nuclear charge, the USSR industry was simply not able to “pull out” such a project. In addition, no one has canceled the radioactive fallout after a nuclear explosion, even at high altitude. In the event of an unsuccessful launch, the entire launch complex along with the maintenance personnel could have died.
As a result, work on the Taran missile defense system had to be closed, but the very principle of destroying enemy ballistic missiles and satellites was used in other developments of the 20th century.
Sources:
Ground-based strategic missile systems. M., Military parade 2007, 248 pp.
Reusable spacecraft capable of launching from Earth and landing like an airplane have been the subject of development by leading space powers for many decades. However, the difficulties associated with such projects, as a rule, forced us to abandon such an attractive prospect in favor of simpler and more proven means of launching into orbit.
The USSR carried out a number of developments of space aircraft, which, of course, continue in modern Russian concepts. One of the most little-known domestic concepts of such devices is. This is a light space shuttle, which was developed at the V.N. Design Bureau. Chelomeya simultaneously with the famous "Buran". The projects that were being developed at that time had a very serious basis. About 500 enterprises were involved in the design of the space plane. In 1965, the leadership of the industry and the country received a multi-volume preliminary design for consideration. The Soviet space plane of the mid-1960s (implemented in a full-scale mock-up) was a pointed cone with swept wings equipped with deflecting triangular consoles. There were all the necessary conditions for the successful creation of a real spacecraft, but politics intervened. After the October 1964 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the country intensified the fight against “voluntarism”: the new leadership of the USSR punished those whom it considered Khrushchev’s favorites and henchmen. The leadership decided that Chelomey belonged to them. After numerous shocks, OKB-52 managed to survive, but the theme of the space plane was taken away from it. At the beginning of 1965, an order was issued by the Air Force Commander-in-Chief K.A. Vershinin, which ordered that all project materials be transferred to OKB-155 of A.I. Mikoyan. The very next year, there, under the leadership of G. E. Lozino-Lozinsky, he began the project of the Spiral space plane. This rocket plane was supposed to be launched from a cradle on the “back” of the reusable first stage using an additional upper stage. This project, however, was also not subsequently implemented.
A return to the theme of winged descent occurred in the 1970s. At this time, the United States was actively building its Space Shuttle (interestingly, the original concept approved by NASA involved a two-stage system in which both stages were reusable, winged and manned). Our response to the United States was the development of the Buran-Energia system. And then Chelomey decided to get involved in the fight in order to return to the topic of winged descent a decade after the topic of space planes was closed. According to Boris Natarov, who at that time was the head of the Special Design Group for the development of a new reusable system, Chelomei understood that Buran, a system with such an expensive launch, was hardly suitable for solving operational military problems. The ship is also too bulky and expensive for visiting and servicing orbital stations. A lighter and more inexpensive device was required. Work began with clarifying the dimensions of the future spaceplane. Then the payload range was chosen (this was a very difficult choice). Options were proposed from 50 tons of payload (for a certain type of military cargo) to the minimum values that were encountered in parallel developments by the British and Americans (1.5 tons). Ultimately, it became clear that the Buran designers had slowed down a lot, things were going hard and the lack of prospects for using the new ship was increasingly affecting them. Chelomey, seeing this circumstance, decided to make a bold move - to show that the country needs a small device that would combine the optimal launch cost and payload mass.”
This is how the concept of a light space plane arose, the payload of which was 4 tons (instead of 30 tons for Buran), and the orbital mass was up to 20 tons. At the end of the summer of 1980, a decision was made to speed up the work. In just a month, the designers managed to make a full-scale model of the project, which made it possible to calculate all the sketch components. Chelomey’s space plane was developed in two main versions. The first one was unusually similar to the X-37B recently launched by the Americans. The first version of our spacecraft also had two inclined keels, but someone told Chelomey that such designs were aerodynamically imperfect. And he changed his mind on this issue. It is not known how well-founded his doubts were, but, alas, the second version of Chelomey’s space plane became very similar to a smaller Space Shuttle or “Buran”. He probably believed that this would benefit the project and emphasize its adherence to the general course. However, nothing helped advance the project at the political level. Chelomey twice submitted a proposal for a light space plane to the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, but was refused. The last decisive attempt to turn the situation around was Chelomey’s letter to Brezhnev, as a result of which a commission was formed headed by the deputy. USSR Defense Minister Vitaly Shabanov. The commission worked for about two months, and most of its participants issued a negative conclusion. Negative reviews did not concern the design, but the cost of launches and the need for the ship to solve certain problems. In May 1981, this story came to an end. The project was saved neither by letters from academicians from TsAGI, nor by the support of the Air Force, which wanted to go into space at that time. Chelomey’s attempts to prove that the program could, in any case, act as a backup (in case of problems with Buran) did not convince anyone.
Projects like Chelomey's light spaceplane were undoubtedly ahead of their time, which may have prevented them from being translated into real vehicles. Today, this spaceplane can only be judged by photographs of the full-scale model, from which the “secret” stamp has been removed. The layout itself was disassembled at the request of management.
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In the early 60s, the military-political leadership of the USSR was concerned about the strategic decision of the United States of America to begin deploying the Minuteman group of light intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the amount of 1000 launches. In this regard, in addition to the “symmetrical response” - achieving strategic parity with the United States in terms of the number of light ICBMs ready for launch - the task of the country’s missile defense was also considered. The reserves of anti-missile defense (ABM) accumulated by this time - the systems of A. A. Raspletin, V. P. Sosulnikov, G. V. Kisunko, P. D. Grushin - assumed the fight exclusively against single ICBM warheads in the local defense zone and was absolutely ineffective in the event of a “star raid” of hundreds and thousands (including decoys) of warheads on the largest industrial and administrative centers of the USSR. The question of the possibility of repelling a massive strike, for example 1000 ICBMs, remained open.
((direct))
Instruction to V.N. Chelomey to consider the possibility of using the UR-100 ICBM simultaneously as an anti-missile missile, supported by R.Ya. Malinovsky, P.V. Dementiev, V.D. Kalmykov, E.P. Slavsky, S.S. Biryuzov, M.V. Zakharov, V.A. Sudets and S.I. Vetoshkin, was contained in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers dated March 30, 1963 “On the creation of the UR-100 missile system.” It should be noted that D.F. Ustinov did not support the order.
On this order, V.N. Chelomey, heading the development of the most massive light ICBM in the history of the country, the UR-100, and knowing the intricacies of the capabilities of this weapon, came up with a proposal to create a fundamentally new - territorial (on the scale of large regions and the country as a whole) anti-missile system long- and medium-range interception defense, which received the name “Taran”.
V. N. Chelomey’s proposals assumed the use of light ICBMs as a missile defense system, which would reduce the cost of such a system while maintaining the theoretical possibility of creating a territorial missile defense system.
Based on the results of consideration of proposals for missile defense at the country's Defense Council in May 1963, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the development of the Taran missile defense system, which determined the lead executors and ordered the development of a preliminary project on the topic in the fourth quarter of 1963, and in the first quarter 1964 - a comprehensive preliminary project. The same resolution formed the Council of Chief Designers consisting of V. N. Chelomey (chairman), S. A. Adzhemov, P. D. Grushin, E. I. Zababakhin, G. V. Kisunko, S. A. Lebedev, A. L. Livshitsa, N. A. Pilyugina, A. L. Mintsa, A. A. Raspletina, V. P. Sosulnikova, Ya. I. Tregub, P. A. Khromova.
A comprehensive preliminary project was developed in accordance with the general initial data on the country's territorial missile defense/anti-missile defense system, approved by the USSR Minister of Defense in September 1963.
General Designer V.N. Chelomey, who has accumulated sufficient experience in organizing large-scale projects of national importance (missileization of the Navy, creation and deployment of ICBMs, space defense systems for maritime reconnaissance and interception), considered the Taran project as a systemic one.
The Council of Chief Designers approved the results of preliminary studies on the creation of a territorial missile defense system (June 1963) and approved a plan for a comprehensive preliminary project on the topic (September 1963).
The Taran system provided for:
- ground-based radar systems for long-range detection, target tracking and target designation for fire weapons;
- fire weapons based on the UR-100 ICBM with high- and medium-yield nuclear warheads;
- control systems ensuring continuous readiness and conduct of combat operations.
In the future, it was planned to supplement the missile defense system with a space interception segment based on the Chelomeyev interceptor satellite "IS".
The Taran system was supplemented by an object-based missile defense system based on the S-225 and A-35 systems to destroy single warheads that had broken through.
Since extra-atmospheric nuclear explosions did not cause catastrophic consequences on the surface of the Earth, the main method of interception was to detonate the warheads of the heavy Taran class of anti-missile missiles, which led to the guaranteed destruction of any number of warheads, decoys, as well as low-orbit enemy spacecraft at a distance of several kilometers from the epicenter detonation
OKB-52 was identified as the lead contractor for the Taran system as a whole and the UR-100 anti-missile missile. The cooperation included institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Defense and leading industrial enterprises.
Considering the unprecedented complexity of the task, the work involved an in-depth study of the conditions and processes of functioning of the “far arm” missile defense system.
It should be noted that in the conditions of tough confrontation of those years, V. N. Chelomey tried to find the most powerful technical solution to the country’s missile defense problem, which then the leaders of the USSR could successfully “exchange” for certain political dividends (something similar was done later by the Americans within the framework of the well-known “Strategic Defense Initiative”).
Naturally, the work of the new huge cooperation led by V.N. Chelomey did not guarantee the creation of a missile defense-impenetrable territory of the USSR. But concentrating the strategic “sword” and “shield” “in one hand” would allow the country’s leadership to objectively understand their pros and cons and make informed decisions on strategic nuclear forces and missile defense/anti-missile defense.
The removal of N.S. Khrushchev in 1964 led to an immediate strengthening of supporters of the “traditional” missile defense system. Even a conclusion on the developed preliminary design and complex preliminary design of the Taran missile defense system was not made. The enormous scope of work and gigantic state funds went towards the creation of a local missile defense system in Moscow, which was very modest in terms of capabilities.
V. N. Chelomey’s involvement in the missile defense problem in 1962–1963 was essentially an attempt to create in him a director of the national program, albeit with powers limited only to issues of science and technology.
In our opinion, if V.N. Chelomey continued his work on territorial missile defense/anti-aircraft defense, there was a real opportunity to understand much more quickly and deeply what is really advisable to do to maintain strategic stability in relations between states. And this is first of all:
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| Academician A. L. Mints |
- improving strike ICBMs by supplementing them with complexes of means to overcome missile defense;
- creation of an active protection system for silos and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces with increased security;
- improvement of early warning and security systems for strategic nuclear forces and their information interaction with each other and with firing systems.
These main directions of counteraction were asymmetrical, provided a guaranteed retaliatory strike, did not require fabulous investments and made it possible to confidently maintain strategic stability.
The experience of many years of work on creating a missile defense system in the USSR speaks of the danger for the Russian economy of rash political decisions aimed at independently solving the problem of global missile defense. It is important to take this into account when developing the state arms program of the Russian Federation for 2011–2020 and other system-forming programs for the development of the state.
G. A. Efremov,
Honorary General Director, Honorary General Designer of JSC VPK NPO Mashinostroeniya
A. I. Burgansky,
Deputy General Designer of JSC VPK NPO Mashinostroeniya
V. A. Dementyev,
Advisor to the General Director of JSC VPK NPO Mashinostroeniya